Understanding Israel's Public Diplomacy Strengths Weaknesses

*As it appeared in the September 2011 issue of Israel Council on Foreign Relations

The revolution in communication technologies has had a drastic and indelible
effect on politics. The advent of 24-hour news networks and the internet has
accorded the media a central role in the dissemination of information and images,
forcing political actors to play by—and cater to—the media’s “rules of the game” in
formulating policy. This is commonly known as the “mediatization” of politics, and
in the competition for the limited resource of media attention, “newsworthiness”
is the prerequisite.

The effects of this media revolution are even more intense in the international
sphere—between countries or peoples, where territory and resources are at stake.
In today’s world, wars are won less on the ground and more frequently in the
diplomatic arena, where persuasion and media savvy are the keys to victory.
Mediated Public Diplomacy (MPD) is “the organized attempts by a government
to exert as much control as possible over the framing of the country’s policy in
foreign media.”1 For the purposes of this essay, a frame is a narrative or particular
interpretation of events.

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a paradigmatic example of the centrality of
MPD in an international conflict. Israel is locked in a battle with the Palestinians,
not just over territory, but over domination of the international media’s framing of
the conflict. Both are acutely aware of the media’s key role in influencing foreign
public opinion and government policy, but Israel seems to have greater difficulty
in its MPD. Its most glaring weakness is the fact that it rarely undertakes major
political/diplomatic initiatives. This is of crucial importance, as the event initiator
is in a position to dictate the lexicon of the event and frame it consistent with its
own interpretation. Further, “the event initiator is also granted more access to the
media,” which is much more receptive “to showing its position.”2 The Palestinians
seem to understand this implicitly, and have succeeded in not only dictating the
lexicon—“occupation,” “occupied territories,” and “apartheid,” to name a few—
but in initiating events. Consequently, the Israeli government often finds itself in a
defensive, reactive pose, chasing the frame, and focusing on damage control.
This posture was on display in the flotilla incident in June 2010, and continues today
with the upcoming Palestinian statehood bid at the United Nations in September.

Israel’s public diplomacy posture is by no means arbitrary. Rather, it is a natural
outgrowth of a deeper problem. Israel rarely launches proactive initiatives
because it has not yet managed to articulate a definitive strategic vision regarding
its composition (as a Jewish and democratic state); its character (secular versus
religious); its minorities (Arabs and other non-Jews); and its borders (the
desirability and contours of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza). In
contrast, the Palestinians strategic goal is clear and axiomatic—statehood. Of
course, it is difficult to implement substantive MPD initiatives when there is no
overarching strategy and no defined objectives to advance. This reality trickles
down to Israel’s political arena, which is characterized by disharmony, and its
political institutions, which are rife with dissent. With coalition governments these
days usually comprising three major parties—each with its own distinctive vision
and voice, each occupying important roles in the government—the result is little
unity and even less uniformity in Israel’s MPD. This phenomenon is evident when
the defense, foreign, and prime ministers all broadcast divergent messages. Dissent
at the highest levels of the Israeli government leaves it more vulnerable to adverse
framing by the target countries’ leaders and media. Simply put, if Israeli leaders
cannot proffer a united position to their own domestic media and audience, how
realistic is it to expect a coordinated and coherent MPD effort?

Proving the importance of political/diplomatic initiative, Itay Gabay and Tamir
Sheafer3 found that Israel managed to dominate the framing of its policy in
the UK and US media when it embarked on the Gaza disengagement in 2005.
Israel’s prime minister at the time, Ariel Sharon, was clear in stating that one of
Israel’s primary aims was to “improve[s] our international standing.”4 Their study
demonstrated that in the lead-up to, and in the course of, the disengagement,
Israel gained more control over its agenda; had far greater success than usual in
promoting its frames; and most importantly, had greater success in promoting its
frames than the Palestinians over the same time period. In taking the initiative,
Israel was not chasing the frame, it was demarcating it. It was not chasing the
story, it was writing it.

However, the study also demonstrated that the effectiveness of Israel’s MPD, and
MPD in general, is to a great extent limited to and determined by the audience.
For immediately after the disengagement, media reporting in Britain returned
to its familiar pro-Palestinian frames, while the US media and public remained
sympathetic to Israel’s frame. This begs the question: why did Israel only gain
a temporary respite from the negative messages purveyed by the British media?
Sheafer and Gabay concluded that the British media returned to their familiar
narrative when Israel ceased to withdraw from territories, suggesting that the key
to successful Israeli MPD is territorial concessions. Of course, this was only the
case in the British—and European5—media, and this leads to another important
question: why did the US media continue to show a higher level of support for
the Israeli frame even after it completed the disengagement? More to the point:
what is the difference between Europe and the US that causes the disparity in
media framing? Sheafer and Gabay attributed the difference to the fact that
the British Muslim community is much larger than the US Muslim community.
But this answer is insufficient, as European pro-Palestinian, pro-Arab positions
predate the influence of the Muslim European demographic.6 Moreover, there
are countries in Eurasia (Albania, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan) with a predominantly
Muslim population that have positive attitudes toward Israel; while the media
in Latin American countries without significant Muslim populations (i.e., Chile,
Brazil) still generate consistently pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel sentiment and
framing.7

The European media’s pro-Palestinian framing is all the more perplexing in light
of the fact that most theories of public diplomacy hold that “cultural proximity”
is central to MPD success. The idea is that “similarity breeds attraction” and
facilitates relations.8 And when it comes to frames, some actors “have a natural
advantage because their ideas and language resonate with a broader political
culture.”9 The cultural proximity between nations is variously measured by such
factors as language, history, political culture and institutions, and religion. Some
effects of political and cultural proximity are “democratic peace,” alliances, voting
in the UN General Assembly, economic interaction, and media comity. Thus,
the cultural proximity theory would predict elite, media, and public support for
Israel in the US and Europe, since Israel is ostensibly more similar to Europe than
are the Palestinians, especially when considering political culture and tradition
(democracy, liberalism, human rights, individual freedoms). There are some
possible explanations for this seeming incongruity: Perhaps Europeans do not
subjectively view Israel as being culturally proximate due to a different definition
of and criteria for “cultural proximity.” Perhaps the defining aspects of European
political and cultural identity have evolved to include universalism, whereas Israel
is defined by its religio-national particularism—Judaism and Jewish peoplehood—
which subjects it to claims of exclusion and the epithet of “apartheid.”

Samuel Huntington, in his book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order, seems to lend credence to Israel’s divergence from the West by identifying
Jewish civilization as unique; as a result, despite being very similar to the West,
Israel is categorically distinct from it.10 Perhaps this understanding of cultural
proximity explains the positive framing of Israel in the US. American society
also evinces a type of particularism—or at least exceptionalism—and tends to oppose
Europe’s universalist tendencies. Still, this cannot be the sole reason for
Europe’s position, as the Palestinians can hardly be said to champion universalism;
particularly when Hamas is governing Gaza and pushing for an Islamic state.
Certainly, the status of women and gays in Palestinian society should offend
European sensibilities. Perhaps Israel is not viewed by Europe as being culturally
proximate because although Israel is a democracy, Europe employs a definition
of democracy to which Israel does not conform; Israel’s use of force against its
neighbors and occupation of territories offends their notions of democratic values
and “defies the conciliatory norms associated with a democratic regime.”11

A more compelling explanation is that Europe’s position on the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict exists somewhat independently of Israel, and is rooted in its own history
of colonialism. The centuries of oppression of indigenous peoples have caused
collective trauma and “post-colonial guilt.” Any conflict with the vaguest contours
or slightest undertones of its own historical experience triggers the simplistic and
puerile oppressor–oppressed paradigm of colonial times, a consequent guilt over
this experience, and its subsequent opposition in order to absolve and redeem
itself. The Europeans are thus a receptive and eager audience for Palestinian
frames. “Publics might not be irrational, but that does not mean they are fully
rational or guided purely by cognition in processing information.”12 This manifests
in a “political culture of habitual skepticism” toward Israeli actions, and “rhetoric
among elites, journalists, and publics.”13 This notion also explains the attitudes
in many countries that were themselves subject to colonization: those of Latin
America and Africa that bear post-colonial resentment. European institutional
elites have the added incentive of pandering to the greater Arab world due to
their dependence on Arab oil, while the media facilitate this narrative and the
public digests and supports it. Each level reinforces the other, and perpetuates a
feedback loop.14 This view of the conflict immediately starts Israel at a handicap,
giving Palestinians a head start and the reflexive benefit of the doubt.

Undoubtedly, the specter of the Holocaust, which haunts Europe’s collective
conscience, adds further complexity to Europe’s position on Israel. The altogether
mendacious comparisons of Israel to Nazis that emanate from European elite
and media sources appear to be motivated by the desire to divest Europe of the
burden of guilt by placing it on Israel, and reflect a profound and unresolved
resentment.

Another weakness in Israel’s MPD is the difficulty in reconciling the needs of
domestic constituents and foreign audiences. This is partially a byproduct of the
revolution in communication technologies, which makes compartmentalizing
messages to specific audiences nearly impossible. To be sure, a government is first
and foremost accountable to its citizens, and this applies equally to its message and
to security. But “the same words and images that are most successful in
communicating to a domestic audience may have negative effects on a foreign
audience.”15 Thus, when faced with constant threats to its security and when
preparing for hostilities, a government seeks unity and for its public to “rally
around the flag.”16 Therefore, the Israeli government’s message and policy is
one of unrepentant resolve in providing security for its citizens, and a crushing
response in the face of threats and dangers. But the lexicon the government uses to
foster these sentiments does not translate well in foreign nations and international
media. What they hear is aggressiveness and jingoism, instead of the conciliation
and compromise required to engender a spirit of peace. This was highlighted by
Sheafer and Shenhav in Israel’s choice of the name Operation Cast Lead for its
military operation against Hamas in 2008.17 Undertaken during Hanukkah, the
name Cast Lead (oferet yetzukah) is a reference to well-known Hanukkah song, one
that most Israelis understood. But translated into English, Operation Cast Lead
merely evoked images of belligerence.

All actors are susceptible to the domestic–foreign audience divide, including the
Palestinians. Paralleling their language of conciliation and peace to world leaders,
they placate their domestic audience in another language, with anti-Israel incitement
and delegitimization. But the disparate responses to the Israeli and Palestinian
domestic messages seems to reinforce the international media’s pro-Palestinian
framing; while Avigdor Liberman is lambasted for his xenophobic warmongering,
Mahmoud Abbas’ incitement is either excused as placating “the Arab street” or
ignored outright. Those international actors supportive of the Palestinian frame
thus simply dismiss any rhetoric that is dissonant with their narrative. In this
regard then, Israel is left with a stark dilemma of priorities in its MPD, and it
almost takes the nature of a zero-sum game: Any focus on satisfying the domestic
will risks alienating the international community; while any attempt to placate the
international community risks provoking a sense of disenfranchisement among
domestic constituents.

The advent of the 24-hour news cycle also poses an MPD difficulty for Israel. The
main storylines and images depict Israel as being in a permanent state of conflict,
branding it an aggressive warmonger. Furthermore, Israel is at the forefront
of a relatively new type of conflict—asymmetrical, urban warfare between an
army and terror group/proxy, with high likelihood of civilian casualties and
collateral damage. Israel must not only justify the war, but defend against claims
of disproportionate response and the deliberate targeting of civilians. When
newsworthiness is the standard for coverage, schoolyards damaged by shellfire
simply do not have the same persuasive, attention-grabbing, emotional effect as
bloodied children. As the saying goes, “If it bleeds, it leads.” And when images are
broadcast ad nauseum, they rapidly and inevitably attain iconic status. Images
bereft of context will typically cast Israel in a very poor light.

Though MPD is clearly an uphill battle for Israel, Israel does have some
advantages. It is possible that in spite of the cultural distance described between
Israel and many international actors, this distance is shrinking as a result of
the new warfare in which they too must engage, and the threat of terror that
Europeans too have begun to face. From Spain to Germany to Britain, the elites
and the public are learning firsthand the difficulties and challenges that terrorism
and asymmetric warfare pose. In sharing Israel’s predicament and facing similar
issues, it is possible they will be able to relate and more easily sympathize with
Israel. Though such sympathy is not yet reflected in a shift in public opinion, there
is certainly an effect on the governments’ view of the problem, as many of them
have enlisted Israel’s help in combating it. This in itself fosters more opportunity
for cross-cultural cooperation and understanding. Cultural proximity may also
be fostered on the citizen-level in Europe, where there appears to be a backlash
against multiculturalism—a byproduct of universalism—and a desire to preserve
their particular national heritage. Still, these benefits are mitigated by the fact that
European and other international actors distinguish the Islamic threat from the
Palestinian issue, in that they believe that Palestinians are justified in resorting to
terrorism, or even that such acts are not terrorism at all, but rather self-defense.
Further, they see their concern with preserving their national culture as entirely
distinct from the issue of two warring peoples over a small piece of land. Thus,
for many, the post-colonial, oppressor–oppressed paradigm remains largely
unaffected. It is therefore understandable that the media have not reflected these
shifts in European sentiment onto the Israeli–Palestinian frame.

The recent massacre in Norway gave Svein Sevje, the Norwegian ambassador
to Israel, cause to reflect on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and in the process
provide a testament to Europe’s unyielding attachment to its narrative. He stated
that “We Norwegians view the occupation as the reason for terror against Israel...
Whoever thinks this way will not change his mind as a result of the attacks in
Oslo.”18 The resort to terrorism is viewed here as justified, and almost legitimate,
in light of Israel’s occupation.

Engagement at the forefront of this new media-saturated warfare not only places
Israel under unceasing scrutiny, it also offers Israel an opportunity to be an
innovator by addressing the challenges inherent in live-image asymmetric warfare.
As an example, the media scrutiny is what likely motivated the IDF to create a
Youtube channel for the IDF Spokesperson’s unit, allowing it to flood the internet
with select images at the outset of a conflict. Perhaps in the future, it will assign
an embedded multimedia specialist to every combat unit, to document the challenges
they face and defend their actions.

The end of the Cold War offered Israel the opportunity to cultivate relations
previously untapped due to Soviet hostility, and to intensify relations with states
with which it formerly had limited, discreet relations, namely, in Southeast Asia
and Eastern Europe. As a result, Israel has begun to look beyond the West for
friendship and allegiance. India has become a strong and open supporter of
Israel,19 while the East Europeans are far more supportive of Israel in the media
and in diplomatic forums than their West European counterparts.

Israel also has a valuable resource in its significant immigrant populations,
which can provide culturally sensitive and linguistically tailored messages. Even
though its leaders’ messages may be discordant, at least Israel can avoid sending
ill-equipped messengers to deliver unsophisticated messages in broken second
languages. Israel can dispatch its British, Australian, North American, South
African, French, Russian, East European, and South American-born citizens to
their respective countries of origin to transmit polished rhetoric and policy.

Going forward, the most effective measure Israel could enact to advance its MPD
would be the formulation of a strategic vision regarding its composition, character,
minorities, and borders. From a comprehensive strategy a diplomatic policy will
more naturally flow, as the objectives guide the initiatives. This coherence would
greatly minimize contradictory messages emanating from the government as
well. Until such time that a strategic vision is formulated, there are a number of
initiatives that would improve Israel’s MPD.

The United States’ post-9/11 MPD effort in the Islamic world is an instructive
starting point because, like Israel, the US has to contend with reflexively hostile
audiences. In the wake of 9/11, and in recognition of the impact foreign attitudes
have on domestic affairs, the US embarked on a massive and enduring MPD
campaign for the hearts and minds of the Islamic world. Employing a leading US
PR firm, it invested $12 million on an unprecedented global advertising campaign,
seeking to rebrand the United States.20 It also created a radio station (Radio
Sawa), a magazine (Hi Magazine), and a TV station (al-Hurra), all directed at
the Islamic world. What the United States failed to understand was that despite
best intentions, these initiatives were perceived as classic American arrogance and
“imperialism,” imposed this time through a one-sided information barrage.

Complicating matters, the few initiatives that had an interactive component failed
due to a cultural distance that went unappreciated and unaccounted for. In 2005,
Karen Hughes, newly appointed as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy
and Public Affairs, promptly launched a “listening tour” spanning from Egypt to
Indonesia. It was widely considered a failure due to her cultural ignorance and
illiteracy.

The massive MPD blitz foundered because it reinforced the prevailing skepticism
and narrative in the Islamic world of an arrogant, imperialistic bully. The shelf-life
of many initiatives reflected this failure, as did the favorability ratings of the United
States, which were at an all-time low in the Islamic world when President Bush
left office. Having poured vast resources into courting the Islamic world, the Bush
administration failed to engage it, much less dominate its framing of US policy. This
episode painfully demonstrated the crucial importance of understanding the target
audience, and the centrality of interacting with that audience in consummating an
effective MPD initiative.

Of course, Israel does not have the benefit of America’s vast resources. On the
contrary, it has limited resources and limited budgets. Thus, it must prudently
manage its diplomatic priorities. It should consider its audience and distinguish
between those that are—or have the potential to be—receptive to Israel’s frame,
and those that seem to bear a reflexive hostility. This will foster the formulation
of distinct MPD initiatives for the different audiences, and appraise the relative
priority of a given audience - the level of engagement and the amount of resources
it warrants. In furtherance of this, Israel should—if it has not already—perform
comprehensive research and analysis of the audiences it seeks to influence and
effect. The aforementioned immigrant communities in Israel offer a valuable
resource when the time comes to convey the nuanced message and interact with
the target audience.

At the outset, and before all audiences, Israeli diplomatic demarches and interaction
should address the post-colonial paradigm. It would be a great mistake to shun this
issue out of fear that such discussion would acknowledge and “legitimize” the
arguments of its proponents. Israel should utilize the opportunity to inject context
by emphasizing, as a matter of fact, that the reconstitution of the Jewish people
on the same land over which it was sovereign 2,000 years ago is a unique event in
modern history. This fact should underscore the inadequacy of the conventional
terms and definitions, and the necessity for solutions that address and reflect the
conflict’s unprecedented nature. Within such a frame, the post-colonial paradigm
is counterproductive since it does not accurately reflect the reality on which a just
solution should be based.

Regarding those publics and media that seem to bear reflexive hostility, the most
effective MPD initiatives are cultural exchanges, most notably foreign journalist
tours of the country. Here, instead of taking MPD to the audience, the audience is
brought to Israel; public diplomacy is effectuated through first-hand experience,
not a one-way advertisement. Recognizing the value of such initiatives, a number
are already taking place in Israel: Project Interchange, under the stewardship of
the American Jewish Committee, brings current and future policy-leaders and
opinion-makers to Israel for a seven-day educational travel seminar; and in August
2011, the IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, in cooperation with The Israel Project, held
a meeting with twenty members of Arab media in Israel, discussing an array of
issues, all in Arabic.21

Non-profit organizations like Project Interchange and The Israel Project seek
international participants from the political, financial, and social sectors, as well
as from university campuses, where the conflict has high resonance, where new
ideas are being germinated, and where future leaders and opinion-makers are
being nurtured. These exchanges enable journalists and other professionals to
become acquainted with a country that figures prominently on the international
agenda, and more importantly, to acquire context. They leave the country with a
view beyond the war-torn images, and even if they remain doggedly loyal to their
adverse frames, the experience undoubtedly influences their perspectives. Direct
exposure to Israel’s democratic system, demographic diversity, and geographic
dimensions can only assist in proving the complexity of the conflict, and the
inadequacy of the well-worn journalistic tropes. While currently organizations
like Project Interchange and The Israel Project work in conjunction and coordination
with the Israeli government and military, the government should take the lead
and make supporting, funding, coordinating, and initiating cultural exchanges a
cornerstone of its diplomatic policy.

For those audiences Israel deems more receptive to its frame, Israel should focus its
MPD on initiatives to bolster and diversify relations. This includes the exchanges
mentioned above, as well as intensifying its burgeoning relations and formalizing
them in bilateral agreements, defense pacts, and alliances. The US has been a
stalwart ally of Israel, and its guardian in the international arena. Israel has reaped
extraordinary benefits from the friendship, but such friendship obviously confers
on Washington commensurate influence over Israeli decision-making. Israel’s
singular dependence on the United States at times isolates it further, making Israel
more vulnerable, and creating tension in the US–Israel relationship. It benefits
both countries that Israel seeks out and cultivates additional dependable allies. As
mentioned, India presents a strong prospect for strategic partnership and alliance.
There are other global players, like Taiwan and South Korea, with which Israel
has established growing strategic and cultural ties. These are countries that have
strong advanced technologies industries and have experienced rapid economic
growth, all while under the shadow of territorial conflict. To some extent they share
a dimension of Israel’s predicament, and are thus more receptive to Israel’s
narrative. They also lack Europe’s post-colonial prejudice.

Israel would gain a “cooperative advantage” with the formation of alliances and
pacts.22 Instead of appearing as an isolated voice, Israel could present itself and its
policies with the support and endorsement of a number of diverse actors, increasing
its security and stability in the international community. Forming alliances thus
becomes a public diplomacy initiative in itself.

Lastly, whatever the budget constraints, Israel should establish a distinct planning
and strategy department to cope with such issues. Such a department must not
only prepare rapid response capability, but also participate in policy-making.
Coordination is critical when domination of the framing of an event hinges on a
few moments or a few images.

Israel’s MPD is replete with challenges, both within and beyond its borders. Some
weaknesses are self-inflicted and remediable, while others are external and thus
only manageable. Israel must constantly balance the will of its domestic constituents
and the demands of the international community, all the while assuring that it
is fostering its security, prosperity, and its place among the nations. Given that
the effectiveness of its MPD is limited to some extent by its audiences and their
own politics, cultures, and histories, Israel should be mindful of Joseph Nye’s
statement that “even the best advertising cannot sell an unpopular product.”22
That is a warning against unrestrained ambition when enacting political initiatives
for the sake of international favor. There is real danger and considerable cost in
discovering that an initiative was futile, or that international favor was fleeting—
and with the stakes so high and its margin for error slim, Israel cannot afford to
ignore such risks.

Notes
1 Tamir Sheafer and Shaul R. Shenhav, “Mediated Public Diplomacy in a New Era of
Warfare,” The Communication Review, XII:1 (2009), 275.
2 Itay Gabay and Tamir Sheafer, “Mediated Public Diplomacy: A Strategic Contest over
International Agenda Building and Frame Building,” Political Communication, XXVI:4
(2009), 456.
3 Ibid., 447–467.
4 Ibid., 450.
5 The terms “’Europe” and “European” in this context are used to denote the countries
that comprise Western Europe. I distinguish non-Western European countries with the
prefix “Eastern.”
6 For examples, see inter alia, Charles de Gaulle’s sudden shift from an alliance with Israel to an explicitly anti-Israel stance before the Six-Day War, and Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and Swedish Prime Minister-elect Olaf Palme comparing Israelis
to Nazis in 1982.
7 “Israel and Iran Share Most Negative Ratings in Global Poll,” WorldPublicOpinion.
org, March 6, 2007, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/views_on_
countriesregions_bt/325.php?nid=&id=&pnt=325&lb=btvoc.
8 Nehamia Geva and D. Christopher Hanson, “Cultural Similarity, Foreign Policy
Actions, and Regime Perception: An Experimental Study of International Cues and
Democratic Peace,” Political Psychology, XX:4 (1999), 807.
9 William A. Gamson, Talking Politics (New York, 1992), p. 135.
10 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New
York, 1996), pp. 49, 90, 157.
11 Geva and Hanson, op. cit., 809.
12 Robert M. Entman, “Theorizing Mediated Public Diplomacy: The US Case,” The
International Journal of Press/Politics, vol. 13, no. 87 (2008), 88.
13 Ibid., 95.
14 Ibid., 91.
15 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 616, no. 94 (2008), 104.
16 Sheafer and Shenhav, op. cit., 277.
17 Ibid.
18 “Envoy contrasts terror in Israel, Norway, ” JTA, July 26, 2011, http://www.jta.org/
news/article/2011/07/26/3088704/envoy-compares-terror-in-israel-norway.
19 Though India also suffered under colonial rule and would thus be expected to bear
hostile sentiment to Israel, it is unique in that shares many of Israel’s problems: Long-
standing conflicts with neighboring states, based on religious and ethnic differences,
as well as disputed territories; sizable ethnic minority populations that are a source of
tension and friction; and persistent threats of terrorism. These commonalities (as well as
other historical factors) seem to overwhelm the post-colonial resentment India’s elites
and public may have. And thus, India and Israel are an excellent example of growing
cultural proximity. See: Itamar Eichner, “From India with Love,” Ynet News, March 4,
2009, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3696887,00.html.
20 R.S. Zaharna, “Public Diplomacy through the Looking Glass: Obama, US Public
Diplomacy and the Islamic World,” World Politics Review, March 16, 2009, p. 2, http://
www.american.edu/soc/faculty/upload/Zaharna-public-diplomacy-islamic-world.pdf.
21 Jonatan Urich, “IDF Spokesperson meets with Arab media members,” IDF Spokesman
News, August 4, 2011, http://www.idf.il/1391-12619-EN/Dover.aspx.
22 Zaharna, op. cit., p. 4.