The need for caution: Israel's engagement with Turkish mediators

Last month Israel and Syria revealed that “track two” peace talks were taking place through Turkish mediators. These talks, led in large part by the foreign policy activism of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, are indicative of the changing foreign policy priorities pursued by Turkey’s ruling AKP (Justice and Development party) since coming to power in 2002. This JNI piece seeks to explore the changing nature of Turkish foreign policy through the lens of Israeli-Syrian talks and the implications that these changes will have on Turkish mediation efforts which include Israel.

Turkey’s Renewed Relationship with Syria
Given current trends in Syrian-Turkish relations, it is easy to forget that Turkey nearly launched an incursion into Syria in 1998 following intelligence confirming that Damascus was harboring Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan. Turkey responded by amassing 150,000 troops on Syria’s northern border, threatening to invade if Ocalan was not expelled.

Current relations between Turkey and Syria amount to a sea change in Turkish foreign policy. Since the AKP came to power in 2002, various bilateral agreements have been signed including a military-student exchange program, a free-trade agreement which increased trade from $797 million in 2006 to $1.2 billion in 2007 and multiple high level visits. Most recently, Syrian Oil Minister Sufiyan al-AW proposed a nuclear cooperation pact with Turkey for the production of electricity. (Turkish officials have not publicly responded to al-AW’s comments). There are also plans for the two countries to create a joint-oil prospecting firm.

Taken at face value, one explanation accounting for this rapprochement deals with the development of Turkey’s Kurdish Southeast. Some Turkish analysts believe that increased bilateral trade could carry economic benefits for Turkey’s Kurds, a constituency that the AKP draws support from and which has called for the economic development of their region.  Another explanation suggests that because Syria has been one of the few vocal supporters of Turkey’s military incursions into Iraq to stamp out PKK enclaves, Turkey owes Syria. But these explanations do not address the heart of Turkeys evolving foreign policy priorities.

Turkey’s Policy of Strategic Depth
Turkey’s renewed relationship with Syria has more to do with a changing foreign policy philosophy than with appeasing a constituency, national security, or fleeting interests. One of the leading theoreticians reorienting Turkish foreign policy is Prime Minister Erdogan’s chief foreign policy advisor, Ahmet Davutoglu. Currently, Davutoglu is one of the main shufflers carrying messages between Damascus and Jerusalem.

In 2000, Davutoglu authored “Strategic Depth", a treatise on Turkish foreign policy. A fundamental tenet of “Strategic Depth” suggests that Turkey “should be seen neither as a bridge country which only connects two points, nor a frontier country, nor indeed as an ordinary country, which sits at the edge of the Muslim world or the West.” Davutoglu concludes by saying that “Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea country.” On this basis, AKP foreign policy must develop sound ties with each of its cultural and geographic “basins.”

At first glance this looks oddly similar to Ataturk’s mantra of “peace at home, peace abroad.” Indeed, Davutoglu himself has written that Turkey has been successfully pursuing a “zero problem policy toward Turkey’s neighbors” policy over the past four years. But a major difference exists: whereas Ataturk took a firm and proactive role in helping anchor Turkey in the West, Davutoglu sees Turkey’s relationship with the West as one of many, equally important and defining relationships. In other words, under AKP foreign policy, Turkey’s orientation with the West does not deserve preferential treatment. On this basis, any additional energy that was invested in the West and which detracted from Turkey’s ties to its other geographic basin needs to be calibrated. Ergo improved relations with Syria and Iran.

Strategic Depth: Implications for Israel
It is not in the scope of this paper to explore why “strategic depth” has become a powerful force in Turkish foreign policy. Observers of Turkey have attributed this to myriad reasons, including the heightened importance of Islam and identification with Muslim causes in Turkey to realpolitik and hard-core national security concerns. Regardless of their explanations, Turkey’s foreign policy orientation means that when it comes to Israel, it is not business as usual.

Defense relations remain the backbone of Israeli-Turkish relations. Both Israel and Turkey’s secular military establishment understand the importance of this relationship. But the AKP presents a challenge to this fruitful dynamic when it plays the role of mediator between Israel and other countries in the Middle East. This is largely due to the fact that when shuffling between Jerusalem and other Arab capitals, Turkey is as concerned with strengthening its relationship to Israel as it is with its Muslim neighbors. And when it comes to the Middle East, no such line can be straddled.
 

Turkey’s AKP hosting of Hamas politburu leader Kahled Meshal in February 2006 is a case in point. During Meshal’s visit, Erdogan urged Israel to respect the decision of the Palestinian people and recognize the legitimacy of a Hamas government. Given Turkey’s own fight against terror, there is a dissonance in Erdogan’s statement.  Israelis saw this as an affront to Turkey’s previous role as an even-handed broker, such as when it brought the foreign ministers of Israel and Pakistan together for the first time in 2005.

The Syrian Track
If Turkey believes it has the political capital necessary to detach Syria from Iran, Israel could conceivably view Turkey’s mediation efforts as a worthwhile enterprise. But it is unlikely that Turkey possesses such power. Indeed, taking a hard line against Iran would compromise its commitment to ”strategic depth. “ In this regard, it is possible that Turkey’s mediation efforts are aimed to improve Syria’s status in the international community, thereby achieving a victory for Turkey in the Muslim cultural basin. . If Turkey can project to the international community that Syria is serious about peace, a dual victory will have been achieved for both the Assad regime and the AKP: while Assad gains legitimacy, Turkey has extended its strategic depth.

JNI Recommendation to Israeli Government
Despite Turkey’s previous role as a evenhanded broker between Israel and other Muslim states, Israel should carefully evaluate the motivations behind any AKP gesture towards mediation. ….